CEO remuneration during the financial crisis: an empirical analysis
This paper investigates the roles that optimal contracting and rent-extraction theories play in explaining the variation of CEO remuneration during the financial crisis in a sample of 140 Italian non-financial firms listed in the period 2007-2009. By using an OLS regression model, results show that Italian firms reacted to the financial crisis by increasing fixed remuneration in order to reduce CEO losses caused by the decrease of variable remuneration and/or of the value of the company shares owned. These findings are consistent with rent-extraction theory, as CEO remuneration seems to be a tool for extracting a rent rather than a solution for agency problems. This study offers insights to policy-makers that should mandate higher transparency on the criteria used by Italian companies in setting fixed remuneration and enhance the protection of minority shareholders’ rights.
Gaia S. (2013), La remunerazione dell’amministartore delegato durante la crisi finanziaria: un’analisi empirica, Management Control, Special Issue 2, pp. 111-128, Doi: 10.3280/MACO2013-002005
