Capital subsidies in favour of disadvantaged European regions dramatically dropped during the 2007-2013 European Union (EU) programming period due to relevant changes in the EU membership and rules. These changes have implied for beneficiary firms a greater effort both to compete for a lower slide of public resources and to demonstrate their ability to integrate the residual unsubsidised stake of their investments either through their own internal resources or by external financing. Assessing firms’ operating and financial performance becomes thus central for granting authorities that have to select the beneficiaries. In turn, these stricter conditions to gain a non-tax benefit in the form of capital subsidies are expected to influence the financial reporting process of private firms. Using a large sample of beneficiary and non-beneficiary firms, this study aims to investigate whether private firms manipulate their financial accounts in order to benefit from capital subsidies after the EU changed its aid policy. Results show that Italian private firms manage earnings upward, by exercising accounting discretion on specific revenues and expenses, in order to receive capital grants, with a more intense manipulative behaviour for Southern firms and at growing levels of subsidisation.
Key-Words: Earning Management, Capital subsidies, private firms, EU regional aid policy
